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Abstract 
 
We examine the causal links between U.S. industry-wise credits and stock markets. The full 
sample bootstrap Granger causality results show that all stock markets Granger cause their CDS 
counterparts and there is also bidirectional causality for the banking, healthcare and material 
industries. The short-run parametric stability tests highlight that the full sample parameters are 
not stable and hence less reliable. The bootstrap rolling window estimations confirm the 
inconsistency in the CDS-stock causality relationships where bidirectional causalities are also 
found between the credit and stock markets that vary over different sub-samples. Finally, we 
analyze the impact of different financial and macroeconomic determinants on the CDS-stock 
causality through a probit model. Overall, the business conditions, stock market volatility, 
default premiums, Treasury bond rate and the slope of the yield curve are major drivers of the 
CDS-stock nexus. Our findings provide possible explanation for varying and mixed previous 
empirical findings in the existing literature, and hence have useful investment implications.  
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1. Introduction 
The new literature in empirical finance that uses nonlinear models and techniques that may 
fit better subperiods is faulting the old literature that uses linear models and applies the 
estimation to full sample periods when the results are time-dependent and difficult to capture 
with linear techniques. Some authors now say that empirical finance is in crisis (De Prado, 
2015). Others assert that a possible solution to false empirical findings lies in multiple trials and 
peer p-values (Harvey and Liu, 2015).  
The financial and credit markets have economic and financial interconnections that are 
multilateral in dimension and having various feedback loops. Causal linkages among the 
financial markets in particular are multisided and may be multidirectional and difficult to capture 
with old techniques. They are of theoretical, practical and policy importance. The results are 
important because they have implications for portfolio diversification, hedging, speculation, 
arbitrage, market integration, contagion risk, market efficiency, among others. This narrative 
applies to the link between the CDS and stock markets particularly when the investigation of the 
link is conducted at the industry level. The substantial use of CDSs as a tool to hedge and 
speculate credit risk by short-term traders like speculators and long term investors such as 
institutional investors has increased their importance as tools for risk management practices and 
requires better methods to obtain more accurate results.  
The price of CDS contract is determined by the credit risk of the underlying entity, and 
market practitioners rigorously evaluate the value of CDS contracts for credit risk management 
decisions. Thus, the CDS price reflects the market view on the credit risk and plays an important 
role for credit risk assessment. The deterioration (increase) in credit quality (risk) leads to 
widening of credit spreads, whereas the CDS spread decreases (tightens) with the improvement 
in credit quality. Thus, it is worth examining the connections of the CDS markets with the stock 
markets using new nonlinear techniques and rolling the window bootstrap causality estimation 
over subsamples. 
Fung et al. (2008) suggest that due to the very nature of these contracts, the CDS market 
responds quickly to the credit events and leads the stock market when exposed to a shock. 
Similar findings are reported by Blanco et al. (2005), Zhang (2008) and Coudert and Gex (2010). 
However, Narayan et al. (2014) find that the stock market contributes to the price discovery in 
comparison with the CDS markets 1 . Previously, Norden and Weber (2004 & 2009) also 
empirically confirm the definite lead of stock markets in the price discovery process. Finally, the 
literature on the relationship between the CDS and stock markets is not only mixed but also 
inconclusive (Narayan et al., 2014).   
The linkage between the CDS spreads and stock markets does not necessarily have to be the 
same over the sample period, but it may be time-varying and subject to regime shifts resulting 
from unexpected changes in economic and financial market conditions. For instance, the global 
financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2013 had increased 
the fear and risk aversion in the stock markets and amplified stress and spillover effects in 
financial markets in general. In those circumstances, market participants whether they are 
speculators such as hedge funds and market makers or long-term investors such as pension funds 
and other institutional investors alter their expectations, risk tolerance, risk aversion and beliefs. 
The nature of the relationship between the CDS spreads and stock markets in the aggregate or at 
                                                             
1 Hassan et al., (2015) found that sovereign CDS and bond markets of emerging countries are cointegrated and 29% 
times, price discovery occurs in CDS markets.  
the industry level may also have changed during such extreme financial conditions. The 
participants in the credit and stock markets who have heterogeneous preferences and diverse risk 
tolerance may become particularly active under different economic and market conditions, 
especially during the periods of high financial turmoil and in different industries. Furthermore, 
the findings of previous works have underscored that the relationship between the CDS and stock 
markets is time-dependent and, hence, may be sensitive to the sample period but they have not 
done our work (e.g., Forte and Pena, 2009; Lenciauskaitė, 2012; Tabak et al., 2016). Therefore, 
the conclusions drawn by assuming in the literature that the relationship between the two types 
of markets is permanent or linear may be misleading. 
In this paper, we take part in the stream of research concerning the lead-lag relationship 
between the CDS and stock markets in the United States in two ways. First, we examine this 
relationship at the industry level as the industry dynamics of both markets are different (Narayan 
et al., 2014). The findings may suggest some investment implications (e.g., arbitrage 
opportunities may exist when the individual industry is considered). Second, the causal nexus 
between the CDS and stock markets is examined through a rolling window bootstrap causality 
test2. As discussed above, the literature on the relationship between CDS and stock markets not 
only provides mixed findings, it also differs in the sample and methodology used for the 
analysis. Moreover, the previous studies utilize the approach where the full sample period is used 
for analysis. We argue that the causal relationship may vary over time3 and may radically differ 
during volatile periods (e.g., the global financial crises of 2008-2009). This has motivated us to 
adopt a different approach to examine the relationship between the CDS and stock markets in the 
aggregate and at the industry level and in a time-varying fashion, which should also allow us to 
explore the determinants of the causal links for the two markets. Finally, we examine the 
possible determinants of the CDS-Stock nexus at the industry level, using the probit model and 
evaluate the forecasting of causality using fitted vs. observed casualty estimates for the 
industries.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the relevant literature on the 
CDS and stock market relationship. Section 3 discusses the econometric framework. Section 4 
details the data and empirical results, and Section 5 concludes the paper and offers some policy 
implications. 
2. Related Literature  
Similar to the stock market indices, those of CDSs were launched during 2004 in an effort to 
assist the credit risk traders to manage and diversify the portfolio credit risk. These CDS indices 
provide liquidity, efficiency and lower the cost of trading credit risk (Fung et al., 2008). The 
standardization of CDS contracts in terms of an index provides liquidity to the CDS market and 
hence decreases the bid-ask spread. From a portfolio perspective, the cost to replicate a credit 
risk portfolio through CDS indices is also lower than buying and selling individual CDS 
contracts. Each CDS index serves as a standard benchmark to evaluate the specific underlying 
exposure. For example, the CDX.NA.IG (CDX.NA.HY) index may be seen as the benchmark 
credit risk exposure of investment grade (high yield) bonds issued by the North American firms. 
                                                             
2 The causality is in the Granger sense (Granger, 1969). 
3 The stock markets may Granger-cause the CDS markets during some sub-periods and not in others, or there might 
be bidirectional causality in some sub-periods. 
The significant growth and understandability of credit markets is considered a result of the 
development of CDS indices (Bank for International Settlements, 2005).  
The CDS price/spread depends on the credit risk of associated/underlying reference; 
therefore, a trader can evaluate the CDS price through three different methods. One way of 
quantifying the credit risk is to follow the credit ratings assigned by rating agencies (Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s are the two well-known raters among the others) because these agencies 
substantially review the firms’ ability to serve and repay their future obligations. This approach 
is also known as the reduced form credit risk modeling. The second method relies on the 
structural modeling approach where the price of default is determined based on the firms’ 
fundamentals.  The accounting ratios such as return on assets and leverage along with earning 
volatility can be used to measure the probability of default and hence the price of default risk. 
The third and more simplistic approach considers that the market (stock) provides the general 
view on the credit quality and hence the market price, in case of many informed trades, reflects 
the amount of credit risk associated with the underlying assets. Therefore, change in the stock 
price of an entity can be used as a quantitative measure of its credit risk. 
Theoretically, the stock price of a firm impacts its CDS spread. The structural model 
proposed by Merton (1974) suggests that CDS spreads and stock prices have a negative 
relationship with each other. The deterioration in the financial conditions of a firm increases the 
probability of default on its underlying debt obligations. Therefore, financial distress conditions 
may result in a decrease in the value of firms’ stocks and increase the CDS spread. The empirical 
works by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Blanco et al. (2005) and Kapadia and Pu (2012) suggest 
a weak correlation between stock returns and changes in credit spreads. However, the capital 
structure arbitrage that exploits the relationships between the CDS and stock prices may enhance 
the integration and information flows between these markets (Fung et al., 2008). 
It is also argued that an informed trader may prefer CDSs over stock shares in order to take a 
hedge (insure against default) or speculative (bet on the likelihood of default) position due to the 
market opacity and entrenched leverage advantage of CDSs. Additionally, CDS contracts trade 
based on the notional amounts; therefore, the physical size of the market does not impact the 
trading volume. A CDS contract can be created whenever the other side (market maker) is 
willing to buy and sell. Based on these advantages, the informed traders, on aggregate, may 
prefer to trade in the CDS market compared to trading the stocks. This trading preference 
between the two markets would result in a price discovery advantage to the CDS market. On the 
empirical side, Longstaff et al. (2005) found mixed result on the lead-lag relationship between 
CDS and stock price using individual firms’ data. Using CDS and stock market indices, Fung et 
al. (2008) concluded that the lead-lag relationship between these markets is rather complex in 
nature. They also made a distinction between high yield and investment grade CDS indices and 
argued that the high yield CDS index due to low credit quality of the companies is more 
vulnerable to credit events. In general, buying insurance against default has more (less) value and 
frequency when the underlying is issued by the low (high) credit quality firms. Therefore, it is 
more likely that high yield CDS index may lead the stock prices than the investment-grade CDS 
spreads.  
The studies on the relationship between CDS spread and stock prices can be divided into two 
distinct groups. The first group utilizes the micro approach where the interconnectedness 
between the markets has been studied using firm level data. Longstaff et al. (2005) are the first of 
those who analyzed the CDS markets’ lead-lag relationship with corporate bond spreads and 
stock returns of U.S. firms. They find that both CDS and stock markets lead bond market but the 
lead-lag relationship between CDS and stock markets is unclear. Norden and Weber (2004) 
investigate the European CDS markets and find a negative correlation between CDS spread 
change and stock returns. Furthermore, their analysis suggests that stock returns lead CDS spread 
changes. 
Norden and Weber (2009) investigate 58 international firms using daily data over a three- 
year time period and re-affirm that individual stock returns significantly lead CDS spread 
changes for most of their sample firms. Moreover, a definite lead of the stock market relative to 
the CDS market is found. However, those authors also suggest that the co-movement between 
the markets is affected by the credit quality of the sample firms, and the co-movement increases 
with the decrease in credit quality. Similar findings are also reported by Forte and Pena (2009) 
using North American and European firms’ data. Moreover, Forte and Pena (2009) suggest that 
price discovery process of CDS and stock prices depends on the financial situation of a firm. 
Stock market turnover, firm’s credit quality and negative shocks significantly contribute towards 
the stock markets’ price discovery. Stock markets lead both bond and CDS markets but this 
information leadership is time dependent and has decreased over time.  
Contrary to these studies, Blanco et al. (2005) find that the price discovery occurs in the CDS 
market and it anticipates deterioration in credit quality before the stock markets do (Zhang, 
2008). Coudert and Gex (2010) find that the CDS markets lead the bond markets and the current 
financial crisis has increased this leading role of CDS markets. That said, the firm-level evidence 
predominantly indicates that the stock markets lead CDS market with few exceptions.  
Byström (2005) is the first to analyze the relationship between CDS and stock markets, using 
index level data. He empirically confirms the importance of stock market volatility within the 
Merton model and concludes that stock market Granger-cause CDS spread changes. Fung et al. 
(2008) argue that the information flow between the CDS and stock markets is driven by both the 
market-wide systematic risk (e.g., wars and economic recessions) and/or idiosyncratic risk (e.g., 
corporate events such as corporate restructuring or insider trading). Thus, the firms’ level data 
may affect the co-movement and the lead-lag relationship between the two markets, and hence 
authors diversify the idiosyncrasies by using CDS and stock market indices. Fung et al. (2008) 
also made a distinction between investment grade and high yield CDSs and find that the CDS 
markets provide additional information for the detection of default probability beyond the stock 
market. The two-way interaction between these markets is evident especially when the stock 
market is on a downturn. More recently, Coronado et al. (2012) and Lenciauskaitė (2012) 
examine the lead-lag relationship between European CDS and stock markets and confirm that 
stock markets lead sovereign CDSs. However, the CDS market took a lead over stock market 
before the global financial crises of 2007-2008.     
Galindo et al. (2014) argue that ﬁnancial integration leads to a credit contraction in the case 
of adverse ﬁnancial shocks and also help credit markets to deepen. Therefore, a question like 
whether the CDS market leads/lags the stock market in terms of both pricing and efficiency has 
implications for hedging, speculation and arbitrage. The answer to this question can provide “an 
early warning of large shocks in asset prices”. The presence of information on the transmission 
channels of credit risk across different markets and over time will help to understand the relative 
efficiency of these markets. Additionally, the information may also answer how the functioning 
of these markets may change under different market conditions (Avino et al., 2013). 
Moreover, the industry-wise nature (spread and volatility) of the CDS markets is different, 
and thus they have varying speeds of adjustment, in comparison with the equity counterparts 
(Narayan et al., 2014). For instance, Hammoudeh et al. (2013) investigate the banking, financial 
services and insurance sectors’ CDS movements, in the short- and long-run over the period 
2004-2009 and report that the individual dynamic adjustments to the equilibrium are different for 
those sectors. Finally, the lead-lag relationship between CDS and equity markets is time 
dependent (Forte and Pena, 2009; Lenciauskaitė, 2012), and hence it is difficult to be captured 
through traditional econometric techniques.  
3. Econometric methodology 
The equity index is said to be Granger non-causal for the associated CDS index if the 
inclusion of an equity variable in the information set does not improve the forecast of the CDS 
spread. In this paper, we use bootstrap4 version of Toda and Yamamoto (1995) causality tests 
due to the following advantages. The method is simple to implement, can be implemented 
irrespectively of the order of integration and shows better asymptotic distribution (Zapata and 
Rambaldi, 1997). Hacker and Hatemi-J (2006) used Monte Carlo simulations and suggested that 
the modified Wald test with a bootstrap distribution show much smaller size distortions. They 
further show that the test results are less sensitive to sample size, integration orders, and error 
term processes, i.e., homoscedastic or ARCH. To illustrate the Granger causality test in a 
bivariate VAR(p) process, we consider the following equation: 
ݕ௧ = Φ଴ + Φଵݕ௧ିଵ + 	… + Φ௣ݕ௧ି௣ + ߝ௧,												ݐ = 1,2,3, … ,ܶ  (1) 
where ߝ௧ = (ߝଵ௧ , ߝଶ௧)′  is a zero mean independent white noise process with the nonsingular 
covariance matrix ∑. The lag length p is determined through the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). For a simplistic representation, we separate ݕ௧ into two sub vectors, the first one is related 
to the CDS spread (ݕଵ௧) and the second one is related to counter the stock index (ݕଶ௧) and write 
equation (1) in the following form: 
ቂ
ݕଵ௧
ݕଶ௧
ቃ = ൤߶ଵ଴߶ଶ଴൨ + ൤߶ଵଵ(ܮ) ߶ଵଶ(ܮ)߶ଶଵ(ܮ) ߶ଶଶ(ܮ)൨ ቂݕଵ௧ݕଶ௧ቃ + ቂߝଵ௧ߝଶ௧ቃ  (2) 
where ߶௜௝(ܮ) = ∑ ߶௜௝,௞ܮ௞, ݅, ݆ = 1,2௣௞ୀଵ  and L is the lag operator defined as ܮ௞ݔ௧ = ݔ௧ି௞ . In this 
setting, the null hypothesis that the equity index does not Granger-cause the CDS market can be 
tested by imposing zero the restrictions ߶ଵଶ,௜ = 0  for ݅ = 1,2, … ,݌ . Analogously, the null 
hypothesis that CDS market does not Granger cause equity market can be tested by imposing the 
restriction ߶ଶଵ,௜ = 0 for ݅ = 1,2, … , ݌. 
Granger (1969) suggests that the structural instability is the most important problem faced by 
the researchers. Notably, the structural changes may result in a shift in the parameters and hence 
the causal relationship may change over time. To examine the change in the causal relationship 
due to structural changes, we utilize rolling window approach based on the modified bootstrap 
test. The rolling window MWALD causality test procedure initially estimates the MWALD 
statistics for a predefined beginning subsample. For the next estimation, the first (next) 
observation is removed (added) from the beginning (end) of first estimation subsample. The 
relationship is subsequently re-estimated. In this study, we estimate the MWALD statistics using 
a subsample of 52 weeks so that T= 52. The first MWALD causality test statistics are obtained 
using a subsample from 2007:W50 (the start of our study period) to 2008:W49 (i.e., T= 52 
                                                             
4 The technical details of the bootstrap procedure can be found in Balcilar et al. (2010). 
observations). Then the second test statistic is obtained by using the data from 2007:W51 to 
2008:W505. This rolling procedure continues until the last observation is employed to examine 
the causal relationship.  
4. Data and findings  
4.1. Data overview 
 The study examines lead-lag relationship between the CDSs and their equity counterparts for 
11 industries, using the bootstrap rolling window Granger causality. For overall completion, we 
also analyze the CDS market index representing all industries along with the S&P 500 stock 
index. The industries include Banks, Financial, Telecommunication, Healthcare, Oil and Gas, 
Materials, Consumer Goods, Utilities, Industrial, Consumer Services and Technology. This 
weekly data is extracted from DataStream International (Thomson Financial - 2015) for the 
period December 14, 2007 to December 31, 2014 as the industry level CDS indices were 
launched by DataStream on the start data of our sample. We use weekly data to avoid the 
problems of “day of the week” effect and to reduce the noise present in daily data6.  
Figures 1 and 2 show the industry-wise weekly average CDS premiums (in basis points) and 
equity index levels, respectively. We plot the mean and standard deviations (SD) of the CDS 
spread and their equity counterparts by industry, respectively. The figures highlight that the CDS 
premium differs for each industry. It is evident that some industries such as Financials, Industrial 
and Consumer Services have relatively high CDS spreads, suggesting that these industries are the 
most risky. The CDS premiums for Banks, Oil & Gas, and Consumer Goods are nearly as half as 
for the most risky industries. The volatility of the CDS spread as measured by the SD also shows 
a clear industry-wise pattern and in some industries the volatility is high, while in others it is 
low7. 
 
Fig. 1. Weekly averages and standard deviations of US industry-wise CDS premia (basis points). 
 
                                                             
5 For the robustness check on the selection of rolling window size, we re-estimated the Granger non-causality test 
using window sizes of 36, 48 and 60 weekly observations. The estimates are consistent under three different window 
lengths and are available from the authors on request. 
6 We also use the monthly data as a robustness check and results are available on request from the authors. 
7 The correlation between all industry-level CDS and stock markets is significant and negative. The correlation 
results are not presented for the brevity of space; however, are available from the authors on request. 
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Fig. 2. Weekly averages and standard deviations of US industry-wise equity indices (in level 
form). 
Notably, we treat banks and other financial firms separately because earlier empirical works 
suggest that the CDS premiums of these industries react differently to market conditions 
(Raunig, 2015)8. The CDS indices (denominated in basis points so that 100 basis points equate to 
one percentage point) are based on 5-year contracts because the five year credit instruments are 
considered adequate based on liquidity and are widely used in empirical analyses (Narayan et al., 
2014; Hammoudeh et al., 2013). Moreover, senior debt 5-year CDSs are the most liquid 
contracts and represent over 85% of the single-name CDS traded volume (Trutwein et al., 2011). 
The trends of the banking CDS index and the CDS market index along with their equity 
counterparts are shown in Figures 3a and 3b, respectively. A notable increase (decrease) is 
evident in the CDS premium (equity index) during the recent global financial crisis of 2008-
2009.  
a). Banks b). Overall CDS market and S&P 500 
  
Fig. 3. Trends of the CDS market spread (black dotted line) (in basis points) and the equity 
indices (in solid black line). 
 
                                                             
8 Banks have unique characteristics that distinguish them from the non-financial or industrial firms. The balance 
sheet composition, their central role in an economy and different regulatory framework are few of the reasons. 
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The descriptive statistics of both the CDSs (Panel A) and stocks (Panel B) are reported in 
Table 1. The financial CDS premium is the highest (362.82 basis points) among the 11 industries 
and similarly its other statistics i.e. minimum, maximum and standard deviation are also higher 
than those of the other industries. Oil and gas has the lowest average CDS premium (145.32). All 
of the time series are non-normal as the null hypothesis of Jarque-Bera (JB) test is rejected at the 
1% level. For the econometric analysis, all the series were converted into natural logarithmic 
form to reduce the sharpness in data and to increase the reliability of results.  
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of the CDS and stock indices at the industry level  
Industry Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skew. Kurt. J-B stats 
Panel A: CDS Indices 
Banks 152.86 511.96 56.964 76.143 1.555 6.191 304.43*** 
Financials 362.82 984.76 145.10 169.78 1.377 4.943 174.16*** 
Telecommunication 237.45 597.59 107.09 102.59 1.337 4.954 168.20*** 
Healthcare 171.15 391.63 83.786 64.000 1.227 4.570 130.14*** 
Oil and Gas 145.32 393.68 54.654 68.173 1.638 5.548 264.09*** 
Basic Materials 229.30 607.48 90.049 98.064 1.994 7.598 568.00*** 
Consumer Goods 149.98 343.91 84.624 44.934 1.166 5.183 156.43*** 
Utilities 211.85 465.53 74.869 88.005 0.051 2.276 8.2020*** 
Industrial 296.61 866.13 108.58 159.38 1.476 4.787 182.61*** 
Consumer Services 305.65 1186.4 140.49 169.74 2.636 10.42 1271.1*** 
Technology 184.79 509.95 50.254 76.290 1.875 7.356 506.64*** 
Market Index 222.52 589.01 113.42 91.107 1.715 6.234 340.68*** 
Panel B: Stock Indices 
Banks 821.22 1469.6 282.86 211.05 0.576 3.023 20.390*** 
Financials 1801.8 2943.1 748.83 513.20 0.446 2.164 22.941*** 
Telecommunication 505.29 649.81 334.93 86.650 -0.038 1.700 25.988*** 
Healthcare 2562.7 4778.1 1452.0 811.67 1.023 2.916 64.322*** 
Oil and Gas 2063.6 2915.5 1266.4 379.72 0.021 2.141 11.332*** 
Basic Materials 1217.3 1643.2 542.92 252.61 -0.719 3.019 31.741*** 
Consumer Goods 454.79 694.55 248.40 109.10 0.436 2.200 21.486*** 
Utilities 330.20 458.54 209.48 50.791 0.064 2.241 9.0910*** 
Industrial 1720.3 2696.0 726.76 460.92 0.327 2.431 11.515*** 
Consumer Services 1355.7 2380.5 624.45 454.48 0.576 2.174 30.797*** 
Technology 1525.9 2461.4 730.27 388.40 0.304 2.762 6.5170*** 
S&P 500 Index 1361.5 2088.7 683.38 321.94 0.418 2.494 14.656*** 
Note: Max., min., std. dev., skew, kurt and JB stand for maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis 
and the Jarque-Bera normality test, respectively. *** indicates that the null hypothesis of normality is rejected at the 
1% significance level.  
 
4.2. Unit root test results 
The unit root analysis using the Fourier and traditional ADF tests is performed in three steps. 
In the first step, we determine the optimal frequency ( ෨݇) and the optimal lag length ( ሚ݈). Then, the 
F-test is utilized to test the null hypothesis of linearity. If the F-test rejects the null hypothesis, 
then the trigonometric terms are incorporated into the traditional ADF model and the nonlinear 
FADF test is thus appropriate to examine the unit root properties of a time series. In the case the 
F-test fails to reject the null, a standard linear ADF test is then used to draw conclusion (Enders 
and Lee, 2012).  
The results of the unit root tests for all the time series are reported in Table 2. The upper 
panel (A) shows the results for the CDS indices and the lower panel (B) presents the results for 
the equity indices.  These results show that the F-statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
linearity for all the time series, except for the CDS index series of the technology industry. As 
the F-statistic shows non-linearity in the technology CDS time series, we utilize the non-linear 
FADF (߬஽ி) test to draw a conclusion on stationarity. The FADF test rejects the null of non-
stationarity and hence the technology CDS index is stationary in levels, i.e., I(0). For all other 
series, we revert to the traditional ADF test statistics and conclude that basic materials CDS 
index is stationary in level, while all the other series are stationary in first difference, i.e., I(I).  
 
Table 2 
Results of the Nonlinear FADF and ADF unit root tests 
Industry 
Nonlinear FADF  ADF 
෨݇ SSR ሚ݈ AIC F( ෨݇) ߬஽ி  Level First diff. 
Panel A: CDS Indices      
Banks  2 3.166 2 -1.876 3.990 -2.714  -1.190[0] -20.66[0]*** 
Financials  2 2.673 5 -2.026 3.348 -2.126  -1.982[0] -21.51[1]*** 
Telecommunication 2 1.178 1 -2.872 3.271 -1.765  -1.113[0] -17.18[0]*** 
Healthcare 2 1.048 3 -2.973 3.042 -2.752  -1.725[0] -18.28[0]*** 
Oil & Gas 2 3.429 4 -1.779 2.997 -2.537  -2.398[2] -12.64[1]*** 
Basic Materials 2 0.809 5 -3.215 2.650 -2.941  -2.708[2]** -9.887[1]*** 
Consumer Goods 2 0.919 0 -3.130 2.906 -1.925  -1.487[0] -19.16[0]*** 
Utilities 2 7.233 1 -1.058 2.831 -3.048  -2.509[1] -23.80[0]*** 
Industrial 2 1.782 1 -2.459 6.056 -1.534  -0.953[1] -21.22[0]*** 
Consumer Services 2 2.361 6 -2.208 2.361 -1.723  -1.470[0] -5.236[11]*** 
Technology 2 1.320 3 -2.742 6.983B -4.519***  -3.477[2]*** -10.56[1]*** 
Market Index 2 0.936 2 -3.094 5.688 -2.606  -1.752[0] -17.44[0]*** 
Panel B: Stock Indices       
Banks  1 1.246 1 -2.803 2.264 -3.043  -2.310[1] -22.62[0]*** 
Financials  2 0.723 1 -3.355 2.917 -1.369  -1.054[1] -22.21[0]*** 
Telecommunication 1 0.283 5 -4.258 5.600 -3.019  -1.752[0] -21.38[0]*** 
Healthcare 1 0.206 6 -4.568 0.871 0.722  0.703[0] -21.03[0]*** 
Oil & Gas 1 0.473 0 -3.787 4.340 -3.186  -1.815[0] -20.10[0]*** 
Basic Materials 2 0.666 0 -3.445 3.213 -2.173  -1.620[0] -19.66[0]*** 
Consumer Goods 2 0.169 5 -4.772 1.836 -0.251  0.098[0] -20.64[0]*** 
Utilities 1 0.241 0 -4.462 3.285 -2.541  -1.127[0] -19.70[0]*** 
Industrial 2 0.391 0 -3.978 2.938 -1.010  -0.492[0] -18.91[0]*** 
Consumer Services 2 0.287 3 -4.260 1.503 -0.200  0.183[0] -19.54[0]*** 
Technology 2 0.331 3 -4.118 1.791 -0.847  -0.268[0] -19.36[0]*** 
S&P 500 index 2 0.284 5 -4.254 1.979 -0.686  -0.403[0] -20.16[0]*** 
Note: In the nonlinear FADF unit root test, the optimal frequency ( ෨݇) is selected by using the data-driven grid-
search method in which the frequency minimizes the Sum of Squared Residual (SSR).  
߬஽ி and F( ෨݇) are the test statistic and the F-test of the FADF unit root test, respectively. The optimal lag (ሚ݈) is the lag 
length that minimizes the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The critical values are obtained from Table 1b in 
Enders and Lee. (2012). For the traditional ADF unit root test, the critical values are based on MacKinnon (1996). 
The optimal lag lengths of the ADF test in the squared brackets are chosen on the basis of the Schwarz Information 
Criterion (SIC) and (Newey-West Criterion), using the Bartlett kernel. All the variables assume the intercept 
specification. 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3. Granger causality results 
Next, we use the residual-based modified-LR tests (see e.g., Mantalos, 2000; Hacker and 
Hatemi-J, 2006) to examine the causal nexus between the industry CDSs and their equity 
counterparts. The optimal lag length is first determined through the VAR model using the AIC. 
This model’s optimal lag order for each industry pair is reported in the second column of Table 
3. Then the null hypothesis that the CDS market does not Granger-cause the corresponding stock 
market or vice versa is tested using the full sample bootstrap LR statistics and their respective 
bootstrap p-values.  
Columns (3)–(6) of Table 3 display the full sample bootstrap LR statistics and their bootstrap 
p-values for the both non-causality hypotheses. The null hypothesis stating that the CDS market 
does not Granger-cause its stock market counterpart (i.e., CDS −/→  Stock) is rejected for 
Banks, Health Care and Materials. The null hypothesis that stock market does not Granger-cause 
its CDS counterpart (i.e., Stock −/→ CDS) is rejected for all industries based on the LR statistic 
and the bootstrap p-values. The overall results using the full sample bootstrap Granger causality 
tests show that the equity counterparts appear to have a predictive power of their corresponding 
CDSs for all industry indices, while also there are industry CDSs that have a predictive power 
for the Banks, Health Care and Material equity counterparts. The findings based on the full 
sample estimates are in line with Narayan et al. (2014) where they find that equity markets lead 
CDS markets in the price discovery in most of the industries. Notably, Narayan et al provide the 
first and only industry evidence on the CDS-equity markets relationships; however; they use the 
panel data framework with self-constructed industry panels using firm level data.   
 
Table 3 
Full sample bootstrap Granger non-causality results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Industry k CDS −/→ Stock Stock −/→ CDS LR-statistic p-value LR-statistic p-value 
Banks  8 32.007*** [0.0040] 20.332** [0.0240] 
Financials  4 6.8194 [0.1780] 46.548*** [0.0000] 
Telecommunication 3 2.0467 [0.6820] 29.662*** [0.0000] 
Healthcare 6 13.041* [0.0759] 57.294*** [0.0000] 
Oil & Gas 5 7.1574 [0.2680] 34.850*** [0.0000] 
Basic Materials 5 20.990*** [0.0040] 87.452*** [0.0000] 
Consumer Goods 4 0.3158 [0.9840] 56.131*** [0.0000] 
Utilities 2 0.5802 [0.7960] 9.4356** [0.0160] 
Industrial 3 3.1120 [0.4539] 52.183*** [0.0000] 
Consumer Services 8 2.6646 [0.9540] 71.248*** [0.0000] 
Technology 6 12.609 [0.1020] 55.029*** [0.0000] 
Market Index 5 12.830 [0.1820] 61.341*** [0.0000] 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The optimal lag order (k) is 
determined by the AIC.  The relationship CDS −/→ Stock means the CDS spread does not Granger-cause the 
respective stock index. The p-values in brackets are the bootstrap probability values calculated using 2000 
repetitions. 
 
As discussed in the literature review, previous studies on the causal relationship between 
CDS and equity markets provide mixed results by using different sample periods and model 
specifications. It is possible that the mixed findings in those studies are due to the sensitivity of 
the causality tests to sample periods and model specifications. The inference based on Granger 
causality tests would be misleading if the assumption of parameter stability (due to structural 
changes or regime shifts) is violated (Salman and Shukur, 2004). The literature highlights 
various tests to investigate the temporal stability of the VAR models (see e.g., Andrews, 1993; 
Andrews and Ploberger, 1994). We examine the stability of short-run parameters using the 
Supermum Wald test (Sup-Wald) and Supermum Likelihood Ratio (Sup-LR) tests proposed by 
Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994). These short-run parameter stability tests 
require data trimming from both ends of the sample. The test statistics are estimated using a 
fraction of the data [0.15 0.85] with 15% trimming (Andrews, 1993; Balcilar et al., 2010).  
Although it is straightforward to examine the stability of parameters when the variables are 
stationary, in our case the variables are non-stationary and hence this integration-cointegration 
property must be taken into consideration. The variables form a VECM in a cointegrated VAR, 
and therefore it is pertinent to examine the stability of both the long-run and short-run 
parameters. If the cointegration (long-run) parameters are unstable, the model exhibits long-run 
instability. Further, the model has full structural instability if the short-run parameters are also 
unstable. Thus, we can test the consistency of our model, using a two step procedure. In the first 
step, we test the stability of the cointegration parameters, and then the stability of the short-run 
parameters. For testing the stability of the long-run parameters, we apply the Lc test proposed by 
Nyblom (1989) and Hansen (1992). This LM test examines the stability of the parameters against 
the alternative hypothesis that the parameters follow a random walk process i.e., the parameters 
are time-varying. In what follows, the Sup-LR and Sup-Wald test statistics are used to examine 
the swift (the short-run stability) regime shifts.  
The estimates of both long- and short-term parametric stability tests along with identified 
structural break dates are reported in Table 4. The results for the Lc test show that long-run 
parameters of both the CDS and stock price equations are inconsistent at the usual significance 
levels. The system Lc test statistics indicate that the VAR models as a whole turn out to be 
unstable at the 1% level of significance for all industries. The results suggest significant evidence 
of a short-run parameter instability in both equations for all industries as well. The associated 
structural break dates mainly correspond to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and the 2011-
2013 Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Thus, the results show that both CDS and equity markets 
have undergone structural and regime changes during the financial crises episodes. Therefore, 
the overall evidence based on the parameter stability tests indicates that the VAR model 
parameters are not constant over time, and thus the statistical inference based on stable parameter 
assumption is invalid. Further, the inference drawn using the Granger causality test based on the 
estimates of the full sample VAR model for the CDS and equity market relationship are not 
reliable. 
 
Table 4 
The results of parameter stability tests 
 Long-run stability tests Short-run stability tests 
Industry Lc Lc for system Sup-LR Sup-Wald Break Date 
Panel A: CDS equation 
Banks 6.3963*** 19.7773*** 5.1863*** 46.677*** 3/13/2009 
Financials 0.5273** 1.9636*** 5.6051*** 50.446*** 9/20/2013 
Telecommunication 2.2036*** 13.8709*** 5.2692*** 47.423*** 3/13/2009 
Health Care 0.7197*** 10.3748*** 3.1259** 28.133** 1/30/2009 
Oil & Gas 1.3950*** 10.6132*** 12.449*** 112.04*** 11/29/2013 
Basic Materials 4.6754*** 24.4911*** 5.7369*** 51.632*** 6/12/2009 
Consumer Goods 1.0598*** 6.6535*** 3.3178** 29.860** 4/5/2013 
Utilities 1.2333*** 9.9683*** 44.826*** 403.43*** 7/12/2013 
Industrial 0.7758*** 4.9537*** 5.9737*** 53.764*** 11/16/2012 
Consumer Services 2.1114*** 13.4739*** 8.6629*** 77.966*** 12/13/2013 
Technology 1.4477*** 11.6444*** 8.4356*** 75.920*** 5/15/2009 
Market Index 1.4276*** 10.8393*** 4.1530*** 37.377*** 3/13/2009 
Panel B: Stock price equation 
Banks 1.7931*** -- 5.6828*** 51.145*** 3/13/2009 
Financials 0.8720*** -- 6.6293*** 59.664*** 3/13/2009 
Telecommunication 1.3671*** -- 3.9278*** 35.350*** 1/30/2009 
Health Care 5.5493*** -- 2.2158 19.943 3/13/2009 
Oil & Gas 4.0846*** -- 2.5391* 22.852* 9/30/2011 
Basic Materials 5.6618*** -- 7.1236*** 21.371*** 3/13/2009 
Consumer Goods 3.2838*** -- 3.8368*** 34.531*** 3/13/2009 
Utilities 4.4552*** -- 5.6994*** 51.294*** 5/15/2009 
Industrial 1.2564*** -- 3.6253*** 32.627*** 3/13/2009 
Consumer Services 4.9514*** -- 4.7667*** 42.900*** 3/13/2009 
Technology 5.8932*** -- 2.1026 18.924 3/13/2009 
Market Index 3.4189*** -- 4.2578*** 38.320*** 3/13/2009 
Note: The Hansen-Nyblom Lc long-run parameter stability test is applied to each equation separately and to the VAR 
system as a whole. The Sup-LR and Sup-Wald test statistics are appropriate to examine a swift regime shift.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
To accommodate the structural shifts and the changes in the CDS-stock causal relationship 
over time, we estimate the VAR models using a rolling window technique. These rolling window 
estimates are obtained by sequentially changing the subsample of fixed length from the 
beginning of the sample to the end. The VAR model and then the bootstrap causality tests are 
applied for each subsample. This sequential testing of causality has some advantages in 
comparison to the full sample casualty test. The procedure of fixed window rolling estimation 
allows the system to evolve over time and accommodate the subsample instability issue in a 
convenient way, using a sequence of subsamples (Balcilar et al., 2010). 
Balcilar et al. (2010) and Tang and Tan (2015) suggest that the rolling window Granger 
causality estimation require a tradeoff between the window size and the number of estimation 
windows. The heterogeneity in the data may render the estimates based on a large window size 
less precise and the latter will also result in fewer windowed estimates. The use of a smaller 
window may also be imprecise since it may increase the variance of the estimates. However, 
there is no set criterion for selecting the window size for the rolling window estimation. Pesaran 
and Timmermann (2005) highlight two conflicting demands, while selecting the optimal window 
size. The degree of freedom (potential of multiple structural breaks) requires a larger (small) 
sample size for accurate parameter estimation. Considering the data availability of the CDS 
spread at the industry level and the above mentioned tradeoff, we arbitrarily select a window size 
of 52 weeks (a one year time horizon). However, to enhance the precision of rolling estimates, 
we apply the bootstrap technique (see e.g. Koutris et al., 2008; Balcilar et al., 2010).  
The lack of Granger causality from the CDS markets to the equity markets or vice versa is 
examined by estimating the residuals-based p-values of the LR statistic of the VAR model in 
Equation (3). The bootstrap p-values for the 11 CDS-Stock nexuses are plotted in Figures (4a-
4k). The results of the overall CDS index and the S&P 500 index are shown in Figure 4l. In all 
the plots, the time period starting from the first rolling window to the end is shown on the 
horizontal axes. The null hypothesis that y does not cause x is rejected when the p-values are 
below the horizontal black line, showing a less than the 10% significance level. For banks, the 
results in Figure 4a show that the null hypothesis of the CDS does not Granger-cause the stock 
counterpart is rejected during the years 2012-2013. In 2012, U.S. banks celebrated their second-
most-profitable year with a whopping $141 billion in net income, which is barely smaller than 
the record that was set before the crash in 2006.  However, the stock market Granger causes the 
corresponding CDS during the years 2009, 2011 and 2012–2013. Hence, there is a bi-directional 
causality between the Banking CDS and stock indices but only during 2012-13.  
For the Financial industry CDS-equity nexus, the results reported in Figure 4b indicate that 
the CDS spreads Granger-cause the corresponding stock index during the years 2011-12, while 
the Financial stock index Granger-causes the CDS counterpart over most of the time periods. For 
all the other industries9, the results plotted in Figures (4b-4k) point to following important 
findings. The CDS markets Granger-cause the corresponding stock markets for a short time 
period, particularly during 2011-12, for the Health Care, Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Utilities, 
Consumer Services and Technology industries. Moreover, CDSs Granger-cause the stocks for 
Telecommunication and Industrials during the years 2010 and 2013, respectively. However, 
there is no significant causality from the CDS to the stock market for the Consumer Goods 
industry. Further, stock markets Granger-cause the CDS counterparts for the Health Care, Oil & 
Gas, Basic Materials, Industrial and Technology industries for the majority of the sample period. 
Similar findings are evident for the Telecommunications, Consumer Goods and Consumer 
Services industries for most of the sample period. However, there is no causality from the stock 
to CDS markets towards the end of sample period (i.e., 2012-14) for these industries. 
Interestingly, the utilities industry’s stock market does not Granger cause its CDS counterpart 
over most of the sample period. This industry is a natural monopoly that is regulated by policy 
makers. 
The results of the CDS market index and the S&P 500 index (Figure 4l) show causality from 
the stocks to CDSs over most of the time period and also a bidirectional causality between the 
CDS and stock markets during 2012-2013. During this period, Greece downgrades were 
announced and the markets were uncertain of the future. Thus, during volatile periods we mostly 
find bi-directional casual links. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
9  To honor space limitation, we only discuss the plots of few industries including the overall CDS and stock 
relationships as the objective is to highlight the change in relationships, while the industry level investment 
implications of the CDS-equity nexus are beyond the scope of this study. However, for the interested 
readers/viewers, we present plots of all industries. 
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Fig. 4. Industry-level rolling window estimates of Granger non-causality. 
Note: The black horizontal line indicates significance at the 10% level. The relationship ݕ −/→ ݔ implies that y 
does not Granger-cause x. The p-value are obtained using a bootstrap procedure with 2000 repetitions. 
 
In sum, the above findings suggest that the causalities between the stock and credit markets 
vary with time and are unstable over time. The investment decisions (e.g., hedging, speculative, 
arbitrage or long term investing) may be made while considering the dynamics of the industry 
CDS-stock markets relationships and with due caution that those relationships are subject to 
change. It is worth noting that Greece's credit rating was downgraded by Fitch from B+ to CCC 
on July 13, 2011 and there were also concerns about worsening conditions from the start of 2011. 
Our results also reveal that the CDS markets may Granger-cause their stock counterparts during 
the periods marked with significant credit events, which adds to the existing literature that 
suggests that the causality comes from the stock market only.  
4.4. Determinants of CDS-stock nexuses 
After identifying the episodes of significant Granger-causality for the different industries, we 
use the probit regression models to analyze the determinants of the CDS-stock nexuses of those 
industries. For this, our dependent variable (y) takes the value of one if the Granger casualty is 
significant at the 10 percent level and zero otherwise. The objective is to examine and quantify a 
set of instruments (X) that may explain the dynamics of Granger causality between the CDS and 
stock markets for the 11 industries, i.e. the probability of occurrence of this event (y). In doing 
so, we model the probability of observing a value of one as: Pr(ݕ = 1|ܺ,ߚ) = 1 − 	Φ(−ܺ′ߚ) = Φ(ܺ′ߚ)  (3) 
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 where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. We adopt the 
standard convention by assuming that the index specification is linear in the parameters and takes 
the form ܺ′ߚ. 
The explanatory variables in our model are known to impact both the CDS and equity 
markets and hence we hypothesize that these identified variables may explain the interactive 
relationships between these two markets as well. We include in the model the general business 
conditions as proxied by the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (ADS) business conditions index, the market 
volatility (VIX), interest rate, the slope of the yield curve, the default risk premium and the 
Fama-French factors as the explantroy variables. It is evident from the results of short-term 
stability analysis that both credit and stock markets are impacted by the global financial crisis of 
2008-2009 and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2011-2013. To reflect the impact of these 
changes we also use dummy variables for these crises periods as explanatory variables in our 
model. The definitions, sources and related references are provided in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Explanatory variables used in the probit model  
Name Variables Source Reference 
ADS ADS business conditions index Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia Chan & Marsden (2014) 
VIX Market volatility (VIX) index 
representing option-implied 
volatility based on the S&P 500 
index options. 
DataStream International 
(Thomson Financial - 
2015) 
Collin-Dufresne et al., (2001);  
Galil et al. (2014) 
SPOT Five-year Treasury Constant 
Maturity Rate (TCMR). 
St. Louis Federal Reserve 
(FRED) 
Collin-Dufresne et al., (2001);  
Galil et al. (2014) 
SLOPE Differences between the 10-year 
Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 
and the two-year Treasury 
Constant Maturity Rate. 
St. Louis Federal Reserve 
(FRED) 
Fama & French (1989);  
Galil et al. (2014) 
PREM Default premium calculated as the 
yield spread between Moody’s Baa 
and Aaa corporate bonds. 
St. Louis Federal Reserve 
(FRED) 
Altman & Kishore (1996);  
Galil et al. (2014) 
SMB Return on a small capitalization 
portfolio minus the return on a big 
capitalization portfolio. 
Kenneth French website Fama & French (1993); Galil et al. (2014) 
HML Return on the portfolio of high 
book-to-market stocks minus the 
return on the portfolio of low 
book-to-market stocks. 
Kenneth French website Fama & French (1993);  Galil et al. (2014) 
DM1 Dummy Variable for the global 
financial crisis (2007-09)  
Crisis period takes the 
value 1 and 0 otherwise 
National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) 
DM2 Dummy Variable for the Euro 
Area recession (2011-13) 
Crisis period takes the 
value 1 and 0 otherwise 
Centre for Economic Policy 
Research (CEPR) 
Note: The crisis dummy variables (DM1 and DM2) take the value one during crises and zero otherwise. The crises’ 
dates are specified according to the sources mentioned in this table. 
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 The estimation of the probit model is done using the general-to-specific approach based on 
the theory of reduction (Hendry, 1995, Ch. 9). We initially analyze a general statistical model 
with all the explanatory variables and then eliminate the statistically insignificant ones. First, we 
estimate the probit model for the case when the CDS markets Granger cause the stock markets. 
The results are reported in Table 6. The z-statistics and the robust standard errors are computed 
using the Huber–White quasi-maximum likelihood method. The coefficients of the probit 
regressions do not allow a direct interpretation of the impact of an explanatory variable on 
dependent variable. Therefore, we are interested in the ceteris paribus effects of changes in the 
regressors affecting the probability of causality. We calculate the marginal effects and report 
them in squared brackets [ ] below the probit regression coefficient for each predicting variable. 
These marginal effects can be interpreted as the impact of a unit change in a given explanatory 
variable on the probability that the CDS Granger-causes its corresponding stock or vice versa, 
keeping all the other variables constant.  The results are computed using the average values of 
the variables 10  and the distinction of the coefficient signs is made by shading the relative 
columns (i.e., the negative coefficients are shaded with light grey color). 
 For banks, an increase in the statistically significant explanatory variables (ADS, SPOT, and 
SMB) decreases the probability of the CDS Granger causing its stock counterpart. Interestingly, 
the SMB portfolio returns (size premium) also decrease this probability. The importance of the 
bank size as a strong determinant of the Banking CDS premium is also highlighted by Raunig 
(2015) and Bijlsma et al. (2014), among others. Bijlsma et al. (2014) find that large banks have a 
67 basis points funding advantage over small banks. Additionally, it can be inferred that 
deterioration in the business conditions (ADS), and an increase in the interest rate (SPOT), and 
the size premium (SMB) reduces the probability causality flow from the Banking CDS market to 
their corresponding stock market. Notably, VIX and DM2 increase the probability of the CDS 
Granger causing its stock counterpart. 
 Overall, the business conditions (ADS), the market volatility (VIX), the Treasury bond rate 
(SPOT), the slope of the yield curve (SLOPE), and Default premium (PREM) are the major 
drivers of causality from the CDS to the stock markets in most of the industries, but do not serve 
the same causing role for all the industries. Specifically, an increase in the Treasury bond rate 
decreases the probability of causality from the CDSs to stocks for the Telecommunication 
suggesting a calming effect on credit risk of higher interest rates in this industry. On the other 
hand, an increase in the same Treasury bond rate increases the probability of causal flows from 
CDSs to stocks for the Oil & Gas, Consumer Goods, Utilities, and Consumer Services industries, 
underscoring the differential impacts of higher interest rates in the U.S. industries. Therefore, 
increases in government bond yields are processed differently by the CDS and stock markets 
depending on the industry. However, increases in the Treasury bond rate and the slope of the 
yield curve have inverse impacts on the causality flows. If the increase in the Treasury bond rate 
increases (decreases) the probability of CDS Granger-causing stock for an industry, an increase 
in the slope of the yield curve decreases (increases) it for that industry. These credit variables 
thus differentially affect the CDS and stock markets and their causalities as their information 
does not arrive simultaneously in the CDS and stock markets. An increase in the government 
bond yields signals more risk for some but not all industries and hence strengthens the causing 
role of the CDS markets, contributing to greater causality from CDSs to stock markets. On the 
                                                             
10 Nevertheless, the direction of the effect of a change in any of the explanatory variable depends only on the sign of 
the coefficient estimated where a positive value implies that an increase in a given instrument will increase the 
probability of one market causing the other, while a negative value indicates the opposite. 
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other hand, the slope of the yield curve reflects the strength of the economy and the state of the 
business cycle, and would thus be reflected more in corporate earnings and the stock markets 
than in the CDS markets, leading to lower causality flows from CDSs to stocks. 
 A similar impact on the causality flows is observed with the improvement/increase of the 
business conditions and default premium. The improvements in business conditions decrease the 
probability of casual flows from CDS to stock markets whereas increase in default premia 
increase such probability. The market volatility (VIX) is another important explanatory factor 
driving the causality flows from the CDS to stock markets and is significant in the majority of 
the industries. An increase in the market volatility which reflects tightening anxiety in the 
markets would increase the probability of CDSs causing stocks, except for the Technology 
industry. Notably, the dummy variable used to reflect European sovereign debt crisis of 2011-13 
increases the chances of causal flows from CDS to stock markets. The findings that CDSs 
Granger-cause their stock counterparts during the years 2011-12 and that VIX increases this 
probability collectively indicate that under volatile market conditions, the credit markets reflect 
the market information more quickly than stock markets in comparison with normal market 
conditions. These findings suggest that CDS markets may not Granger cause stock markets under 
normal conditions; however, changing market volatility (e.g., VIX) would increase the chances.  
 Further, increases in the value premium (HML) would decrease the probability of the causal 
flows from the CDSs to the stocks causal nexus for the Utilities industry. Finally, the reported 
McFadden R-squared values show the models’ goodness of fit for these relationships, where the 
values range between 0.09 (Banking) and 0.64 (Consumer Goods), suggesting that the industry-
wise impacts of business conditions, market volatility, interest rate, slope of the yield curve, 
default premium and Fama-French factors on the causal flows are different. 
 
Table 6 
Probit models: Causal relationships running from CDS to equity markets 
Industry ADS VIX SPOT SLOPE PREM SMB HML DM1 DM2 R2 
Banks -0.840 0.035 -0.351   -1.994 -0.121     0.548 0.090 
  (-2.710) (2.200) (-2.010) -- (-4.490) (1.325) -- -- (2.350)   
  [-0.262] [0.011] [-0.109]   [-0.621] [-0.054]     [0.171]   
Financial -1.291 0.058   -0.692 -0.158   -1.730   0.154 
  (-5.570) (3.850) -- -- (-1.910) (-2.240) -- (-2.380) --   
  [-0.515] [0.023]     [-0.276] [-0.063]   [-0.690]     
Telecommunication -1.628 0.149 -2.812 5.896 2.476     -6.468   0.531 
  (-4.630) (6.910) (-5.810) (7.150) (3.370) -- -- (-5.380) --   
  [-0.392] [0.036] [-0.678] [1.422] [0.597]     [-1.560]     
Health Care -0.699 0.074     1.753       0.663 0.126 
  (-2.500) (4.260) -- -- (4.050) -- -- -- (3.540)   
  [-0.262] [0.028]     [0.656]       [0.248]   
Oil & Gas -0.540 0.030 0.536 -1.750           0.137 
  (-2.070) (2.230) (2.080) (-5.080) -- -- -- -- --   
  [-0.215] [0.012] [0.213] [-0.696]             
Basic Materials -0.610     0.842 2.087 -0.131     0.635 0.193 
  (-2.180) -- -- (3.620) (4.970) (-1.670) -- -- (2.740)   
  [-0.198]     [0.274] [0.678] [-0.042]     [0.206]   
Consumer Goods 2.009 0.034 2.203   6.680 0.153   -5.679 2.202 0.649 
  (4.900) (1.670) (7.050) -- (7.890) (1.470) -- (-5.530) (6.120)   
  [0.765] [0.013] [0.839]   [2.544] [0.058]   [-2.163] [0.839]   
Utilities     1.886 -2.963 0.901   -0.135 -1.482 1.062 0.352 
  -- -- (3.520) (-4.440) (2.060) -- (-2.110) (-1.960) (2.570)   
      [0.263] [-0.413] [0.126]   [-0.019] [-0.207] [0.148]   
Industrial   0.056   1.992 0.653       1.953 0.328 
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  -- (2.220) -- (6.170) (1.810) -- -- -- (6.450)   
    [0.017]   [0.602] [0.197]       [0.590]   
Consumer Services 1.283   1.056 -0.869 2.225       1.272 0.313 
  (6.010) -- (3.130) (-2.030) (5.720) -- -- -- (5.300)   
  [0.481]   [0.396] [-0.326] [0.835]       [0.477]   
Technology -0.510 -0.061     1.702       -0.711 0.105 
  (-1.870) (-3.740) -- -- (4.020) -- -- -- (-3.830)   
  [-0.192] [-0.023]     [0.642]       [-0.268]   
Market Index -0.666   1.373   0.894       1.236 0.214 
  (-3.090) -- (6.660) -- (2.670) -- -- -- (5.190)   
  [-0.219]   [0.451]   [0.294]       [0.406]   
Note: The z-statistics are given below the parameter estimates in the parentheses, while the associated marginal effects are given 
in the squared brackets. 
ADS= Business conditions index; VIX= Market volatility index; SPOT= Five-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate; SLOPE= 
Difference between the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate and the two-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (i.e., term 
structure); PREM= Default premium calculated as the yield spread between Moody’s Baa and Aaa corporate bonds; SMB= 
Return on a small capitalization portfolio minus the return on a big capitalization portfolio; HML= Return on the portfolio of high 
book-to-market stocks minus the return on the portfolio of low book-to-market stocks; DM1= the global financial crisis of 2008-
2009 dummy; DM2= the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2011-2013 dummy. 
R2 (McFadden) measures the goodness of fit and mirrors the R-squared in OLS. Values between 0.2-0.4 indicate (in McFadden's 
words) excellent model fit. For example, values of 0.2 to 0.4 for the rho-squared represent an excellent fit. 
 
 Now, we estimate the probit models to examine the industry-wise determinants of causality 
from the stock to CDS markets.  The results are reported in Table 7. For banks, an improvement 
in the business conditions (ADS), an increase in the interest rate (SPOT) and the size premium 
(SMB) separately would decrease the probability of causality running from the banking stock 
market to the corresponding CDS market whereas the default premium (PREM) increase this 
probability. The changing market conditions (even improvements in business conditions) 
decrease both directional probabilities (i.e., the causality from stocks to CDSs and CDSs to 
stocks. The banking industry CDS-stock nexus is strong when the market situation is stable. VIX 
would increase this probability probably pointing that the source of fear is coming from the 
banking stock market. However, the magnitude of this effect is very low. The probability of a 
casual flow from the financial industry stock index to the CDS counterpart increases with an 
increase in the stock market volatility (VIX), underscoring a tranquility in financial stability. The 
stock-to-CDS causality also increases (decreases) with the increase (decrease) in the size 
premium (slope of the yield curve). The causal flows from the financial industry’s stock to CDS 
market are also higher during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2011-2013, as the coefficient 
shows a positive value. 
 All in all, for all industries, PREM, VIX, SPOT, ADS and SLOPE appear to be the 
significant determinants of causality flows from the stock-to-CDS counterparts. The stock-to-
CDS causal flows decrease with the improvement in the business conditions for Oil & Gas, 
Utilities, Industrials and the overall market index. On the other hand, improvements in the 
business conditions increase the causality from the stock to CDS markets for the Consumer 
Services industry. Further, surges in default premium significantly increase the probability of 
stocks causing CDSs for Telecommunication, Health Care, Oil & Gas, Basic Material, 
Industrials, Consumer Services and the overall market index. Notably, we find that 
improvements in the business conditions decrease the causal probability, while the default 
premium increases it for the Banks, Oil & Gas, Industrials and overall market index, which 
suggests that the stock-to-CDS causal flows more likely occur during deteriorating market 
conditions.   
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 Moreover, a spike in the Treasury bond rate (SPOT) increases the probability of the causal 
flows running from stocks to CDSs for Healthcare, Basic Material, Consumer Goods, Utilities, 
Consumer Services, Technology and Market Index, while decreases the flows for 
Telecommunication, Oil & Gas and Industrials. An increase in the slope of the yield curve also 
reduces the probability of causality from stocks to CDSs for seven out of the nine cases. The 
probability of equity causing CDS increases with the increase in default premium 
Telecommunication, Healthcare, Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrial, Consumer Services and 
overall market index. An increase in the size premium (SMB) also increases the causality 
probability from stocks to CDSs for Financial. Similarly, the value premium (HML) increases 
the probability that stock markets Granger cause the corresponding CDS markets for Basic 
Materials, Utilities and Market Index. Both the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and the 2011-
2013 Eurozone sovereign debt crisis impact the causal flows from equity to CDS markets and 
their impact is industry specific. Again, the model fit is shown through the McFadden R-squared 
which ranges from 0.08 (for Basic Materials) to 0.48 (for Utilities). The McFadden R-squared 
measures the goodness of fit and mirrors the R-squared in OLS. Values from 0.2-0.4 indicate (in 
McFadden's words) an excellent model fit. 
 
Table 7 
Probit models: Causal relationships running from equity to CDS markets 
Industry ADS VIX SPOT SLOPE PREM SMB HML DM1 DM2 R2 
Banks -0.867   -1.500   2.612 -0.160     0.683 0.320 
  (-2.090) -- (-5.290) -- (4.540) (-1.550) -- -- (2.490)   
  [-0.103]   [-0.179]   [0.311] [-0.019]     [0.081]   
Financial   0.054 -0.511   0.123     1.009 0.230 
  -- (5.460) -- (-2.580) -- (1.750) -- -- (5.160)   
    [0.020]   [-0.185]   [0.044]     [0.364]   
Telecommunication     -5.271 4.352 7.479       -3.487 0.458 
  -- -- (-4.720) (3.700) (5.790) -- -- -- (-5.570)   
  [-0.098] [0.081] [0.139] [-0.065]   
Health Care     1.582 -1.671 0.772     1.258 1.043 0.126 
  -- -- (4.580) (-3.840) (2.160) -- -- (1.980) (4.040)   
      [0.440] [-0.465] [0.215]     [0.350] [0.290]   
Oil & Gas -1.664 0.067 -1.753 4.354 2.257       1.466 0.361 
  (-0.003) (3.490) (-2.660) (4.210) (2.460) -- -- -- (4.310)   
  [-0.090] [0.004] [-0.095] [0.235] [0.122]       [0.079]   
Basic Materials     1.090 -1.704 0.466   0.085   0.544 0.083 
  -- -- (3.400) (-4.120) (2.350) -- (1.460) -- (2.390)   
      [0.306] [-0.479] [0.131]   [0.024]   [0.153]   
Consumer Goods   0.088 1.592 -2.553           0.293 
  -- (2.780) (1.980) (-1.900) -- -- -- -- --   
    [0.001] [0.011] [-0.017]           
Utilities -0.540 0.041 0.685 -3.048     0.190     0.486 
  (-2.610) (2.440) (1.840) (-4.870) -- -- (2.180) -- --   
  [-0.067] [0.005] [0.084] [-0.376]     [0.023]       
Industrial -0.767 -0.105 -1.283   2.050       -2.353 0.269 
  (-1.760) (-2.520) (-4.120) -- (2.830) -- -- -- (-5.390)   
  [-0.095] [-0.013] [-0.160]   [0.255]       [-0.293]   
Consumer Services 1.315 0.048 0.512   2.868     2.306 1.168 0.348 
  (4.770) (3.100) (2.160) -- (6.130) -- -- (2.830) (3.420)   
  [0.284] [0.010] [0.111]   [0.620]     [0.498] [0.252]   
Technology     1.581 -1.559 -1.054     1.287 1.068 0.101 
  -- -- (4.690) (-3.670) (-2.960) -- -- (2.060) (4.220)   
      [0.432] [-0.426] [-0.288]     [0.352] [0.292]   
Market Index -0.909   1.984 -1.493 1.858   0.135   1.979 0.405 
  (-4.250) -- (4.830) (-3.100) (4.690) -- (1.830) -- (6.970)   
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  [-0.345]   [0.753] [-0.566] [0.705]   [0.051]   [0.751]   
Note: The z-statistics are given below the parameter estimates in the parentheses, while the associated marginal effects are given 
in the squared brackets. 
ADS= Business conditions index; VIX= Market volatility index; SPOT= Five-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate; SLOPE= 
Difference between the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate and the two-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate (i.e., term 
structure); PREM= Default premium calculated as the yield spread between Moody’s Baa and Aaa corporate bonds; SMB= 
Return on a small capitalization portfolio minus the return on a big capitalization portfolio; HML= Return on the portfolio of high 
book-to-market stocks minus the return on the portfolio of low book-to-market stocks; DM1= the global financial crisis of 
2008-2009 dummy; DM2= the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2011-2013 dummy. 
R2 (McFadden) measures goodness of fit and mirrors the R-squared in OLS. Values between 0.2-0.4 indicate (in McFadden's 
words) excellent model fit. For example, values of 0.2 to 0.4 for the rho-squared represent an excellent fit. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the CDS-equity nexuses for 11 industries in the United States by 
employing bootstrap Granger causality tests, using industry level data. We use weekly data that 
span the period from December 14, 2007 to December 31, 2014. The bootstrap Granger causality 
tests are conducted using both the full sample and rolling window subsamples. The later is 
utilized to cater for structural changes and their impacts on the Granger causality estimates.  
The findings of the full sample bootstrap tests reveal that the stock markets Granger-cause 
the CDS counterparts in all cases, and there is also a bi-directional causality for the Banking, 
Healthcare and Materials industries. The results also show that the full sample short-run 
parameters are unstable due to structural changes and regime shifts caused mostly by the recent 
global crises including the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and the 2011-2013 Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis. The rolling window approach provides strong empirical evidence that the 
lead-lag relationship between the stock and credit markets for all industries is dynamic with 
varying degrees of causalities because of structural breaks. The stock markets at the industry and 
overall market levels lead their CDS counterparts, except for the Utility industry, over the 
majority of the time period, using the rolling window approach. However, the industry CDS 
markets also Granger-cause the corresponding stock markets when being a part of bidirectional 
causalities during the volatile market conditions. For the overall market index, the causality also 
runs from the CDS markets to the stock markets during 2009-10 and then 2011-13, which adds a 
new result to the existing literature that concentrates on the stock-to-CDS causality.  
Further, the study analyzes some of the possible determinants of the CDS-stock causal 
nexuses at the industry level through the probit model. The overall results show that the business 
conditions, the Treasury bond rate, the slope of the yield curve, and the market volatility (VIX) 
are the major determinants of the causality from the CDS to stock markets in most of the 
industries. The findings also suggest that the impacts of the macro-economic determinants on 
this relationship are industry-dependent and that different market conditions may increase (or 
decrease) the probability of the Granger causality running from the CDS to the stock markets and 
vice versa. For example, hikes in VIX would increase the probability of CDSs causing stocks for 
almost all industries reflecting fear and anxiety in the markets, whereas increase in interest rates 
enhances the causal flows from stocks to CDSs in majority of cases. Changes in the different 
macro-economic information may be processed in stock markets but not in the credit markets or 
both simultaneously. Hence, those changes may affect the CDS-stock interactions and the 
probabilities of causality for the industries differently.  
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